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CONFLICT OF LAWS IN THE FEDERAL COURTS:
THE ERIE ERA *
By PAUL A. WOLKIN t
For almost a hundred years following Swift v. Tyson 1 the Fed-
eral courts, in suits founded on diversity of citizenship, held themselves
free to exercise an independent judgment in matters of "general" juris-
prudence, where their only concern was the unwritten law of the state.
Erie R. R. v. Tompkins 2 abridged this freedom: "Except in matters
governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the law
to be applied in any case is the law of the State. And whether the law
of the State shall be declared by its Legislature in a statute or by its
highest court in a decision is not a matter of federal concern. There
is no federal general common law." 8
The decision in the Erie case was the culmination of a persistent
and continually rising tide of criticism of the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson.
4
The Rules of Decision Act,5 it had been indicated, was intended to
apply to the decisional as well as the statutory law of a state, contrary
to the construction placed upon the statute by Justice Story.6 Swift
v. Tyson had not, in the Court's opinion, achieved the benefits that had
been anticipated. State courts followed their own bent, as they were
entitled to do, on questions of common law and the national uniformity
sought by Justice Story remained a pious hope. The outcome of a
lawsuit more than ever came to depend upon the forum chosen, and
the federal forum which was to protect the non-citizen from local dis-
crimination was used by the non-citizen to deny to the citizen the bene-
fit of the laws of his state. Finally, a majority of the court stated that
if the construction in Swift v. Tyson of the Rules of Decision Act were
valid, the statute was unconstitutional.7
* This article was prepared for the Practising Law Institute.
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1. I6 Pet. i (U. S. 1842).
2. 304 U. S. 64 (1938).
3. Id. at 78.
4. See reference cited in notes 3 to 6 of Mr. Justice Brandeis' opinion, 304 U. S.
at 72, 73.
5. 28 U. S. C. (194o ed.) § 725.
6. Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of x789 (1923)
37 HARV. L. REv. 49, 51-52, 81-88.
7. A few of the multitude'of comments evoked by the Erie decision: Bowman, The
Unconstitutionality of the Rule of Swift v. Tyson (1938) I8 B. U. L. REv. 659; Cole,
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Under Erie R. R. v. Tompkins, if A is sued in the federal court
for negligent injury or breach of contract, his liability is to be deter-
mined by reference to state tort or contract law. If, for example, the
tort or breach of contract occurs in Pennsylvania and suit is brought
in a federal district court of that state, then the Pennsylvania law of
torts or contracts is applicable. Thus, in diversity of citizenship suits
since the Erie decision, the Supreme Court has required the federal
courts to apply state law to determine the construction of contracts
of insurance,8 the duty of a lessor of a truck to maintain it in a rea-
sonably safe condition,9 the applicability of a liquidated damages clause
in a construction contract,1° the validity of a testamentary trust,'1 the
liability of an employer for occupational diseases due to his negligence,' 2
and liability for unfair competition and common law "trademark in-
fringement." 13
However, if a citizen of Massachusetts ran over a citizen of New
York in the latter state and suit was brought in a district court of
Pennsylvania, was the federal court free to determine for itself the rule
of reference to the state law which it must follow? And was the same
court free to determine who had the burden of proof on the issue of
contributory negligence; and what evidence was sufficient to send the
case to the jury or to require a directed verdict against the plaintiff?
Or if the suit involved a contract where the offer had been made in
Pennsylvania, accepted in New York, and which required performance
in New Jersey, and equitable relief rather than a remedy at law was
.sought, was the doctrine of the Tompkins case still applicable? And
was a federal court required to deny recovery if recovery could not be
had in the state in which the federal court was sitting because it was
against state public policy? Finally, was the state law which a federal
judge must follow only that pronounced by the highest court of the state
or were decisions of inferior tribunals also of binding effect?
Erie v. Tompkins and the Relationship Between Federal and State Courts (942) 36
Am. POL. Scr. REv. 885; Jackson, The Rise and Falls of Swift v. Tyson (1938) 24
A. B. A. J. 6o9; McCormick and Hewins, The Collapse of "General" Law in the Fed-
eral Courts (1938) 33 ILL. L. Rxv. 126; Shulman, The Demise of Swift v. Tyson
(1938) 47 YALE L. J. 1336; Stimson, Swift v. Tyson--What Remains? What is
(State) Law? (1938) 24 CoRe. L. Q. 54.
8. Ruhlin'v. New York Life Ins. Co., 304 U. S. 202 (1938) ; New York Life Ins.
Co. v. Jackson, 3o4 U. S. 261 (1938) ; Rosenthal v. New York Life Ins. Co., 304 U. S.
263 (1938).
9. Hudson v. Moonier, 304 U. S. 397 (1938).
io. Six Companies of California v. Joint Highway District No. 13 of California,
31I,U. S. 18o (1940).
ii. Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Field, 311 U. S. 169 (194o).
12. Vandenbark v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 3I U. S. 538 (ig41).
13. Pecheur Lozenge Co., Inc. v. National Candy Co., Inc., 315 U. S. 666 (1942).
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I
"Because of the importance of the question whether the fed-
eral court was free to disregard the alleged rule of the Penn-
sylvania common law, we granted certiorari." '4
In Erie R. R. v. Tompkins suit had been brought in a federal dis-
trict court of New York for an alleged tort in Pennsylvania. In its
opinion, the Supreme Court apparently indicated that the tort law of
Pennsylvania was to be applied. It was not explained, however,
whether this result followed because the federal court was free to choose
its own conflict of laws rule or because the federal court must apply
the conflict of laws rule of New York.
Under Swift v. Tyson the former probably was true: federal courts
were free to exercise their independent judgment in arriving at the
conflicts rule to govern the rights and liabilities of the litigants in a
diversity suit with multi-state factual contacts. 15  But since the Supreme
Court had not discussed the question in the Erie case, and then ex-
pressly reserved it in a subsequent decision, 1 law review writers and
federal courts readily joined debate on how the issue should be
resolved.
17
Many a cogent argument was advanced for the view that the matter
should be handled as it had been theretofore. State conflict of laws
rules were difficult to determine and nonexistant in many instances.' 8
By hypothesis, the cases in which the issue arose involved multi-state
contactual facts and what state law should govern was more appro-
priately a matter for decision by the federal judge whose approach would
be less apt to be tainted by the parochialism of state judges. If some
14. Erie R. R. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64 at 71 (I938).
15. Authorities are collected in McCormick and Hewins, note 7 supra, at 138,
n. 45; Note (1941) 41 COL. L. REv. 1403, n. 3.
16. Ruhlin v. New York Life Ins. Co., 304 U. S. 202, 2o8, n. 2 (1938). In Sib-
bach v. Wilson & Co., Inc., 312 U. S. I (941), suit was brought in a federal district
court of Illinois for bodily injuries inflicted in Indiana. The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and the courts of Indiana provided for physical examination of the plaintiff
upon order of the court, but Illinois did not authorize such a procedure. Justice Rob-
erts stated that if the right to be exempt from the order of the court for physical ex-
amination is substantive, the district court would be required to apply the law of Indiana
where the cause of action arose and to order a physical examination.
17. For the view that the matter was one for the independent determination of the
federal courts: Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Klaxon Co., 115 F. (2d) 268, 275-277
(C. *C. A. 3d, 1940); Note (939) 52 HAxv. L. REv. 1002, 1007; Griffin v. McCoach,
1n6 F. (2d) 261 (C. C. A. 5th, 1940) semble. Contra: Sampson v. Channell, io F.
(2d) 754 (C. C. A. Ist, i94O), (1940) 27 VA. L. Rav. 12o; a later decision by the
Third Circuit itself in Waggaman v. General Finance Co. of Philadelphia, Pa., Inc.,
116 F. (2d) 245, 257 (i94o) ; GOODRICH, CONFLICr OF LAws (2d ed. 1938) § 12; Mc-
Cormick and Hewins, note 7 supra, at '138, 139. Cf. Cheatham, Sources of Rides fdr
Conflict of Laws (1941)- 89 U. OF PA. L. REV. 430, 446, 447.
18. See Goodrich, Mr. Tompkins Restates the Law (ig4i) 27 A. B. A. J. 547, 548,
where a quantitative analysis is made, state by state, of the instances where there is an
absence of state decisions on propositions stated in the RESTATEMENT, COxFLICT OF
LAWS (1934). The maximum was 739o, Tennessee; the minimum, 20.1o, New York.
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of the facts transpired outside the United States, then certainly the
federal judge should be free, in deciding the rule of reference, to consider
the interests of the United States as a nation, rather than be bound
by the limited views of a state judge. Finally, the old view would
help promote a uniform conflict of laws system in the United States,
with the Supreme Court the ultimate arbiter as to choice of law rules. 19
The opposition had for its case the clear cut policy position taken
by the Supreme Court in Erie R. R. v. Tompkins that the accident of
diversity of citizenship should not make possible a difference in the
outcome of a lawsuit. If state A says, in the case where a negligent
act done in state B starts a force which kills a- man in state C, suit
for damages for death must be brought under the statute of state B;
and the federal court in state A points to the statute in state C, then
a suit brought in the federal court may well arrive at a result different
from that which would have been reached had suit been instituted in
the state court "a block away." If this were permissible, "then the ghost
of Swift v. Tyson" would indeed still walk "abroad, somewhat shrunken
in size, yet capable of much mischief." 20 Furthermore, state conflict
of laws rules are a part of state substantive common law 21 and as such
would appear to fall within the orbit of the Erie case.
The issue was finally resolved by the Supreme Court in Klaxon
Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., Inc. 22  A judgment had been recov-
ered in the federal court in Delaware for the breach of a contract made
and to be performed in New York. The plaintiff then asked the court
to correct the judgment by adding interest from the date the action
had been commenced, in accordance with a provision of the New York
Civil Practice Act. The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Cir-
cuit, relying on its independent determination of the conflict of laws
rule to be applied, sustained the plaintiff's contention. 22 "
On appeal, the Supreme Court disapproved of the lower court's
disregard of the state choice of law rule as not in conformity with the
principles of Erie R. R. v. Tompkins. It held that the conflict of laws
19. For an excellent presentation of this side of the case see Cook, The Federal
Courts and the Conflict of Laws (1942) 36 ILL. L. REv. 493, where the argument for
the contrary view based on the assertion in the Erie decision that the course followed
in Swift v. Tyson was unconstitutional is carefully appraised.
20. Judge Magruder in Sampson v. Channell, ilo F. (2d) 754, 761 (C. C. A. ist,
1940). Cf. the following quotation from Cook, note 19 supra, at 499, "The abolition
of federal departure from state laws dealing with mattdrs of wholly local concern
which the Tompkins case has brought about seems to the present writer wholly desir-
able. It is another matter to extend state rules to conflict of law cases, which are not
matters of wholly local concern to the various States, since they involve factual situa-
tions wholly or partially connected with other States or some foreign country."
21. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934) § 5; GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAws
(2d ed. 1938) § 6.
22. 313 U. S. 487 (1941).
22a. ii5 F. (2d) 268 (C. C. A. 3d, i94O).
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rule to be applied in a diversity of citizenship suit must conform to that
prevailing in the courts of the state wherein the district court sits.
"Otherwise," the court said, "the accident of diversity of citizenship
would constantly disturb equal administration of justice in coordinate
state and federal courts sitting side by side." 23
The decision of the Court in the Klaxon case was squarely rested
upon the major premise of Erie R. R. v. Tompkins. The desirability
of federal uniformity and policy was outweighed by the consideration
that federal courts should not afford an opportunity to escape the judg-
ment which would prevail in a state court.
Must a federal court in a diversity of citizenship case, however,
invariably apply the conflict of laws rule which prevails in the state?
There is at least one set of limitations which, though not giving a
federal court freedom to formulate conflict rules of its own choosing,
does permit it to reject the existing state choice of law rule. The limita-
tions spring from the due process,' full faith and credit, and perhaps
other provisions of the federal Constitution. They have been invoked
by the Supreme Court when state courts have made gross errors in
choice of law problems, 24 generally applying the law of the forum when
the rule of reference reqtiired choice of the law of another state where
the transaction took place. When an attack on a state conflict of laws
rule predicated on these grounds will be successful in the federal forum
is for the most part a matter of conjecture.2 5  In any event, a state
rule will not be any more vulnerable when attacked in the federal court
than it is when attacked in the state court. This has been made clear
by the decision of the Supreme Court in Griffin v. McCoach 2 6 decided
on the same day as the Klaxon case.
In the Griffin case, suit was instituted in a federal district court in
Texas by the estate of a decedent, who had been a citizen and resident
of Texas, for the proceeds of a life insurance policy. The insurance
company successfully interpleaded the trustee of creditors whb were the
beneficiaries and the assignees of some of the creditors and paid the
23. 313 U. S. at 496.
24. E. g., Home Insurance Co. v. Dick, 281 U. S. 397 (1930) (due process);
Bradford Electric Light Co., Inc. v. Clapper, 286 U. S. 145 (1932) (full faith and
credit) ; Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Delta & Pine Land Co., 292 U. S. 143
(1934) (due process). See Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Brown, 234 U. S. 542
(1914) (commerce powers).
25. GooDlmcH, CONFLICT OF LAWS (2d ed. 1938) § ii; Cheatham, note 17 supra, at
437-439; Dodd. The Power of the Supreme Court to Review State Decisions in the
Field of Conflict of Laws (1926) 39 HARv. L. REV. 533; Hilpert and Cooley, The Fed-
eral Constitution and the Choice of Law (1939) 25 WASH. L. REv. 27; Overton, State
Decisions in Conflict of Laws and Review by the Supreme Court under the Due-
Process Clatse (1943) 22 ORu. L. REV. lO9; Ross, Has the Conflict of Laws Become
a Branch of Constitutional Law? (1931) 15 MINN. L. Rlv. 161; Smith, The Constitfn-
tion and the Conflict of Laws (1939) 27 GEo. L. J. 536.
26. 313 U. S. 498 (94).
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proceeds into court. The assignees claimed they were entitled to the
proceeds even though they had no insurable interests. The significant
operative facts had transpired outside of Texas. Under the applicable
foreign law the assignees were not required to have an insurable in-
terest in the life of the insured and were entitled to the proceeds. But,
it was the policy of Texas not to permit assignees to recover in Texas
under such circumstances. The Supreme Court required the federal
court to adhere to this policy of Texas. Since Texas could, under the
Constitution, shut out the assignees under these circumstances and
would have done so had suit been brought in its courts, a federal court
sitting in Texas must do likewisey
The facts of the Griffin case afforded a legitimate opportunity for
deviation from the rule of the Klaxon case. Thus, according to Pro-
fessor Cook, 2  Texas can only determine public policy for its courts
and not for federal tribunals; this was not an instance where a litigant
resorted to a federal forum to gain an advantage over state law since
the assignees were summoned into the Texas federal courts and had no
election as to forum; under the Court's decision, a party who had never
paid premiums might receive the proceeds; 29 and finally, most of the
significant operative facts had occurred outside of Texas.
That a state forum in a conflict of laws case may, subject to con-
stitutional limitations, refuse to recognize a cause of action founded
upon a foreign. set of operative facts is an accepted infirmity of the
prevailing conflict of laws system. But, to perpetuate this infirmity in
the federal courts, where jurisdiction for suits between citizens of dif-
ferent states was created to afford an impartial tribunal free from
local prejudices, 30 vitiates that very purpose of diversity of citizenship
27. For comments on the Klaxon and Griffin decisions see: Cook, note 19 supra;
Notes (1941) COL. L. REv. 14o3 and 8 U. OF Prrr. L. REv. 6o; (I94i) I5 S. CALiF. L.
R-v. 95; (1942) 6 MD. L. REv. 16o; (941) 40 MicH. L. REv. 126; (1942) 20 TEX. L.
REv. 375.
28. Cook, note i9 supra.
29. See decision of Circuit Court of Appeals on remand, 123 F. (2d) 550 (C. C.
A. 5th, 1941), cert. denied, 316 U. S. 683 (1942).
30. It may be argued that the local hostility and discrimination which diversity
of citizenship jurisdiction was intended to obviate was that which would manifest
itself only on a personal level in the court room. The local jurors would, in reaching
their verdict, reflect their animosity towards "foreigners." Perhaps the county judge
would for similar reasons not be an impartial dispenser of 'justice. But, diversity of
citizenship jurisdiction would hardly surmount local prejudice as it manifests itself
at these levels since federal judges and federal juries are selected from the local popu-
lace. On the other hand, discrimination cloaked in the form of a state statute or a
state judicial opinion which requires a court to disregard the law indicated by the
usual rules of reference could be overcome in the federal court if the federal court
were not bound by the state law. Granted that in the Gri& case local prejudice was
directed not against a person as such but against rights established under the law of
another state and that Texas would apply the same rule if such rights were acquired
by a Texas citizen as well as a non-citizen, nevertheless, a federal court, if it is to
achieve one of the main objectives of diversity of citizenship jurisdiction, should be
free to disregard local disregard of rights acquired without the state.
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jurisdiction. Of course, if the dlistrict court in Texas were free to dis-
regard Texas policy, the result in the federal court would have been
different than the result which would have been reached if suit had
been instituted in the state court "a block away." To that extent there
would not have been uniformity in the coordinate administration of
state law in federal and state courts sitting side by side. But diversity
of citizenship jurisdiction is not a mere accident insofar as suits in the
federal courts are concerned where the matter at stake is local dis-
crimination. The desirable goal of obtaining uniformity could jus-
tifiably have been yielded in the Griffin case to the consideration of
freedom from local discrimination which the federal courts are supposed
to assure.
The refusal of the Supreme Court to yield that goal leaves a fed-
eral judge free to disregard an established state rule of reference only
when it violates the federal Constitution. Even then, however, the
federal judge will have to determine what the state rule would be were
the state court confronted with such a ruling by the Supreme Court of
the United States.
II
"The line between procedural and substantive law is hazy but
no one doubts federal power over procedure." 31
For some sixty years prior to Erie R. R. v. Tompkims federal
"practice, pleadings, and forms and modes of proceedings in other than
equity and admiralty causes" had to conform "as near as may be" to
practice in like causes in state courts wherein the federal courts sat.32
Matters pertaining to procedure, not caught up by the Conformity Act,
but embraced by a state statute were controlled by the state statute
under the Rules of Decision Act.33
In some instances, however, federal courts were free not to follow
state law when dealing with, matters generally characterized as pro-
cedural. This was the case when application of the Conformity Act
would have interfered with and affected the common law functions of
the trial judge. Excepted this way were such matters as the manner
of instructing a jury, expressions of opinion upon the evidence, and the"
conditions under which a judge should or should not direct a verdict
where the evidence presented was such that a verdict the other way
would have been set aside.3 4 "This discharge of the judicial function
31. Justice Reed, concurring in Erie R. R. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. at 92.
32. The Conformity Act, 17 STAT. 197, § 5, 28 U. S. C. (1934 ed.) § 724 (1934).
33. See Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. York, 326 U. S. 99, x1o, IIi.
(1945).
34. See Herron v. Southern Pacific Co., 283 U. S. 91 (1931) ; I MooRE AND Faxan-
MAN, MOORE's FEDERAL PRAcrIcE (1938) § 0.03.
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as at common law" was declared to be "an essential factor in the
process for which the Federal Constitution provides." 35 Matters gov-
erned by the federal Constitution, such as the right to a jury trial by
twelve, were also ones for independent federal determination. Finally,
the federal courts characterized as substantive some matters generally
characterized as procedural, such as burden of proof,36 and freed them-
selves from the bonds of state practice in those instances also.
In the same year in which the Supreme Court decided that federal
courts must, in diversity of citizenship cases, look to state law to deter-
mine the substantive rights of litigants, an equally radical change took
place in federal procedure. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
authorized by the Enabling Act of 1934,37 freed federal courts from fol-
lowing state procedure and practice.3 A system of federal rules of
procedure was permissible under the opinion in the Erie case since it
was construed not to infringe upon federal power to regulate procedural
matters in the federal courts. However, both the Federal Rules and
the Erie case excepted from federal power matters dealing with "sub-
stantive" rights. The Federal Rules would be bad to the extent they
exceeded this limitation.
Many matters, generally characterized as procedural, did not come
within the scope of a set of rules to govern court procedure and were
either not covered or just glossed over by the rules. These included,
among other things, judicial notice of the law of another state,39 bur-
den of proof,40 statutes of limitations,41 and perhaps statutes of fraud 42
jand measure of damages.43  If federal courts could characterize as
procedural that which had generally been so characterized in the con-
flict of laws, a wide area of freedom from state law would still remain.
But, was such a position tenable in light of Erie R. R. v. Tompkins?
The basic issue presented in view of the Erie decision was whether
it is more desirable for the federal judiciary to have uniform rules gov-
35. Chief Justice Hughes in Herron v. Southern Pacific Co., 283 U. S. at 95
(1931).
36; GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWs (2d ed. 1938) p. 199, n. 46.
37. "The Supreme Court of the United States shall have the power to prescribe,
by general rules, for the district courts of the United States and for the courts of the
District of Columbia, the forms of process, writs, pleadings, and motions, and the prac-
tice and procedure in civil actions at law. Said rules shall neither abridge, enlarge,
nor modify the substantive rights of any litigant. . . . all laws in conflict therewith
shall be of no further force or effect." 48 STAT. lO64, 28 U. S. C. § 723 (b) (1940).
38. Doubt has been voiced as to whether the Conformity Act has actually been
repealed by the Enabling Act of 1934: "Status of the Conformity Act," 2 FED. RULEs
SRV. (1940) P. 625; Tunks, Categorization and Federalism: "Substance" and "Pro-
cedure" After Erie Railroad v. Tompkins (1939) 34 ILL. L. REv. 271, 288-291. But see
Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., Inc., 312 U. S. I (1941).
39. Strahorn, The Process of Judicial Notice (1928) 14 VA. L. REV. 544, 563.
4o. GOODRICH, CONFLICr OF LAWS (2d ed. 1938) § 81.
41. Id. at § 82.
42. Id. at § 85.
43. Id. at § 88.
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erning the manner in which litigation is to be conducted in its courts
than to assure litigants that their rights and liabilities will not be ma-
terially affected by virtue of suit being brought in the federal courts.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, expressing the policy of the
Congress and, to some extent, the views of the Supreme Court itself,
supported the first of these choices. Erie R. R. v. Tompkins indicated
the latter. Proponents of either choice readily compromised this ap-
parent conflict to their individual satisfaction by varying the dimen-
sions of the hazy in-between which fuses "substance" with "pro-
cedure." 44
Judge Clark early rejected the test with respect to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure that if a rule affected substantial rights or
was an important factor in the outcome of a case it must be set aside
and the state rule followed. The policy expressed in Erie R. R. v.
Tompkins could be reconciled with a uniform system of federal pro-
cedural rules if the federal court would not hold that an issue, tradi-
tionally procedural or on the borderline, is substantive unless the public
policy of the state, as unequivocally disclosed by some clear state statute
or decision, demanded such a result.
4 5
The view that uniformity of result in the federal and state courts
should be largely determinative of whether state law controls has been
championed by Professor Morgan in a recent law review article dis-
cussing matters of proof.4 0  "It is considered more important in the
administration of justice in our federal system to prevent a party from
taking advantage of the accident, of diversity of citizenship to secure
the benefits of a more favorable rule of law than to prevent him from
taking a like advantage of his own immunity from service of process
or his opponent's liability to such service because of the accident of
locality."
The general problem may be divided into two parts, one embracing
those matters expressly provided for in the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure and the other including those matters not so covered. With
respect to the former, a number of rules have been the subject of wide-
44. See Cook, "Substawd" and "Procedure" in the Conflict of Laws (1933) 42
YALE L. J. 333.
45. Clark, Procedural Aspects of the New State Independence (194o) 8 GEO.
WAs H. L. REv. 1230; Clark, The Tompkins Case and the Federal Rules (1941) 24 J.
Am. JuD. Soc. 158. In the latter article Judge Clark urges that it should be presumed
that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are "procedural" and that a federal judge
should not go beyond a state judge in deciding what is substantive. Cf. (1939) 87 U.
OF PA. L. REV. 344, 345, where it is suggested that the determination in the first in-
stance of whether burden of proof on the issue of contributory negligence is "proce-
dural" or "substantive" is in itself "substantive" "because a decision on an issue of
whether a given law does or does not 'relate to the rights and duties which give rise
to a cause of action' must itself relate to those rights and duties."
46. Morgan, Choice of Law Governing Proof (944) 58 HARV. L. REv. 153, 189.
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spread discussion and many decisions, with opinion often divided as
to their validity.
4 7
In Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., Inc.,4" the Supreme Court had occa-
sion to consider the validity of rule 35 providing for the physical and
mental examination of persons. It was conceded that the rule dealt
with procedure but it was argued that "substantive rights" as used in
the Enabling Act were not limited to matters of substance, in the gen-
eral sense of the word, but also included '"important and substantial
rights." Justice Roberts, speaking for the majority of the Court,
found the rule within the mandate of Congress. Although there was
no question presented of "substance" versus "procedure" and federal
power versus state power, the case is of interest in two major respects.
The majority opinion attached significance to the fact that in the final
hearing on the rules by the Congress, objections of the kind raised in
the case were made and Congress did not disapprove the rule. "Evi-
dently the Congress felt the rule was within the ambit of the stat-
ute. . . ." 49 The other point of interest is the test for "procedure"
which Justice Roberts hazarded: "The test must be whether a rule really
regulates procedure-the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties
recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and
redress for disregard or infraction of them." 50
Several years later, the Court, in considering the validity of rule
4 (f) authorizing state-wide service of process, enlarged upon both of
these points: The fact that the Supreme Court had promulgated the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure did not foreclose consideration of their
validity, meaning or consistency. But, the meaning attributed to the
rules by the Advisory Committee was entitled to weight and opinions
47. E. g., "Commencemenit of Actions and the Statute of Limitations" (1941) 4
FED. RULES SERv. 884 '(Rule 3) ; Williams v. James, 34 F. Supp. 6I, 68, 69 (W. D.
La., 194o) (Rule 4 (f) service of process throughout state) ; note 51 infra (Rule 8 (c)
burden of proof on the issue of contributory negligence) ; John R. Alley & Co., Inc.
v. Federal Nat. Bank of Shawnee, Shawnee County, Okla., 124 F. (2d) 995 (C. C. A.
ioth, 1942) (Rule 13, cross-claim or counter-claim) ; Brown v. Cranston, 132 F. (2d)
631, cert. den. sub noma. Cranston v. Thompson, 319 U. S. 741 (1943) (Rule 14, third
party practice); Pitcairn v. Rumsey, 32 F. Supp. 146, 149, 150 (W. D. Mich., 1940)
and Allegheny County, Pa. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 32 F. Supp. 297 (W. D. Pa.,
1940) (Rule iS (b), joinder of remedies) ; Doyle v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 123
F. (2d) 9oo, 903 (C. C. A. 5th, 1941) (Rule 20 (a), joinder of parties) ; "Substance
and Procedure in Stockholders" Suits: Ownership of Stock at Time of Acts Complained
of" (194) 4 FED. RULES Szmv. 909 (Rule 23 (b)); Holtzoff, Equitable and Legal
Rights and Remedies under the New Federal Procedure (1943) 31 CALIF. L. REV. 127,
137-14o, and Morris, Jury Trial under the Federal Fusion of Law and Equity (1942)
20 TEx. L. REv. 427 (Rule 38, jury trial); "The 'Two Dismissal' Rule" (941) 4
FED. RUIEs Smv. 927 (Rule 41 (a)).
See generally, Ilsen, Recent Cases and New Developments in Federal Practice and
Procedure (1941) 16 ST. JoaHN's L. REv. I, 28-44; Clark, note 45 supra; Tunks, loc.
cit. supra note 38.
48. 312 U. S. 1 (1941).
49. 312 U. S. at 15.
50. 312 U. S. at 14.
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of authorized spokesmen of the Committee that rule 4 (f) related to pro-
cedure were of important significance. Most alterations of rules of prac-
tice and procedure often do affect the rights of litigants but the prohi-
bition of the Enabling Act was not addressed to incidental effects, which
necessarily attend the adoption of the prescribed new rules, upon liti-
gants properly before a court. Rule 4 (f) did not abridge, enlarge or
modify the rules of decision by which a court adjudicates a litigant's
rights but merely related to the manner and means by which a right to
recover is enforced and was, therefore, a rule of procedure and not of
substantive right."a
Of all the rules, rule 8 (c) aroused the most'widespread concern
and comment.r" It requires the defendant to plead affirmative defenses,
including that of contributory negligence. Was this rule bad in cases
where the state law placed the burden of pleading on the plaintiff?
Did rule 8 (c) control the burden of proof also and, if so, was the state
rule of burden of proof nevertheless the one to be followed? The
burden of pleading is expressly provided for in rule 8 (c) ; the burden
of proof is not.
Palmer v. Hoffman 52 resolved both these questions. Suit was
brought in a district court of New York for negligent injury resulting
from a grade crossing accident in Massachusetts. Two of the causes
of action rested upon a Massachusetts statute creating a new right.
The Massachusetts statute placed the burden of proving contributory
negligence on the defendant. Two of the causes of action were founded
on the common law. The trial judge, without distinguishing among
the causes of action, charged that the burden of proving contributory
negligence was on the defendant.
The Supreme Court held that rule 8 (c) covered only the manner
of pleading contributory negligence and did not purport to dispose of
who had the burden of proof on this issue. Pleading, it held, was ap-
propriately governed by rule 8 (c).
Then, relying on its decision in Cities Service Oil Co. v. Dunlap 53
and, to some extent, on the traditional federal view as to burden of
Soa. Mississippi Pub. Corporation v. Murphree, 66 S. Ct. 242, 246 (x946).
51. For a collection of early decisions, see Clark, note 45 supra, 24 J. AM. JuD.
Soc. at i59n. 7. Sampson v. Channell, ixo F. (2d) 754 (C. C. A. ist, 1940) to the
effect that the federal court must follow the rule of the state in which it sat, whether
regarded as substantive or procedural by the state, was the leading lower court de-
cision. See Comments (194o) 2o B. U. L. REv. 566, 53 HAwv. L. REv. 1393, (94)
29 CAir. L. REv. 228.
52. 318 U. S. IO9 (943).
53. 308 U. S. 2o8 (I939).' In the Dunlap case, suit was brought to remove a
cloud from title to an oil and gas lease in Texas. The respondents, in a cross-bill,
asserted that the complainant's chain of title was defective in description of bounda-
ries. The latter denied the allegations of the cross-bill and asserted that it and its
predecessors had purchased' for value and in good faith and without notice of mistake.
The complainant claimed that under Texas law the burden of proof on the issue of
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proof, the Court flatly asserted that burden of proof on the issue of
contributory negligence was a question of local law which federal courts
in diversity of citizenship cases must apply. It upheld the charge of
the trial judge insofar as it pertained to the statutory causes of action
since the New York conflict of laws rule in such a case required that
burden of proof on the issue of contributory negligence be determined
by reference to the statute of the state creating the cause of action. The
Massachusetts statute required the defendant to establish contributory
negligence, and the finding of the lower court that New York would
apply. the Massachusetts rule was not disturbed by the Supreme Court,
since a federal district court sitting in New York was bound to apply
the New York conflicts rule.
With respect to the common law causes of action, the lower court
had made no distinction between the conflict of laws rule applicable to
them and the conflict of laws rule governing the statutory causes of
action. But, the Supreme Court cited New York decisions which in-
timated that in the common law actions New York regarded the matter
as procedural and applied the rule of the forum which placed the burden
on the plaintiff. Because the defendant had merely offered a general
exception to the charge of the trial judge, however, the Supreme Court
did not reverse the judgment and remand the case for a determination
of the appropriate New York rule. But, the Court left little doubt that,
if the point had been properly reserved and it had been determined
that New York would have applied its own internal rule as to burden
of proof, the federal court could not have applied any other rule.
Under the Palmer case, therefore, a federal court in a diversity of
citizenship case must place the burden of proof on the issue of con-
tributory negligence upon that party to the law suit upon whom the
state, in which the court sits, would place the burden had suit been
brought there. Conventional conflict of las characterization of burden
of proof as "procedural" is inapplicable and it makes no difference, in-
sofar as the independence of the federal court from state law is con-
cerned, whether the state court regards the matter as "procedural" or
"substantive."
bona fide purchaser for value and without notice was upon him who attacks the legal
title and asserts a superior equity, in this case, the respondents and insisted Erie R.
R. v. Tompkins required adherence to this rule. The Circuit Court of Appeals pointed
out that the state view was as claimed by the complainant and differed from the views
of other jurisdictions. But, it held that this was merely a question of proper practice
in courts of equity and Erie R. R. v. Tompkins was not applicable. The Supreme
Court reversed the decision of the lower court and held that proof the complainant did
not purchase for value and in good faith was part of the very substance of the cause
of the respondents and that it was a "substantial right" upon which the holder of legal
title to Texas land may confidently rely. (Rule 8 (c) was not involved in the Dunlap
case.)
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Stoner v. New York Life Ins. Co.54 also was concerned with the
matter of proof in the federal courts. After a state appellate court had
twice held that evidence on total disability was sufficient to send the
case to the jury, the federal Circuit Court of Appeals in a declaratory
judgment action between the same parties reversed a finding by the
trial judge, sitting without a jury, that the evidence presented estab-
lished total disability. The Supreme Court reversed the Circuit Court
of Appeals. The test for determining total disability had been defined
by the state court and it had been held, on almost the same evidence,
that the question was one for the jury. The federal court could not
hold otherwise.
The Stoner case appears to be an inroad upon the federal view
before Erie R. R. v. Tompkins that, in the exercise of common law
functions of a trial judge, the federal judge is not bound by state law.
Under the Stoner decision a federal judge is bound by state law, even
in the exercise of these functions, where it is clear that freedom from
a state's views would cause an important difference in the outcome
of the litigation. However, unlike other instances involving the ap-
plicability of state law, it probably will not be clear that the result in
the federal litigation will be different unless a lawsuit between the
same parties over the same issues in the state court can be relied upon,
as it was in the Stoner case. Unless this can be established, a federal
judge should not be bound by state law in such matters as commenting
upon the evidence or the credibility of witnesses, and the granting of
a new trial if the verdict appears to the judge to be against the weight
of the evidence. 55
The applicability of state statutes of limitations to diversity of
citizenship actions in the federal courts, a problem not covered by the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, presented another instance for delimi-
tation of federal and state spheres of controlling law. In actions formerly
cognizable at law, local statutes of limitation were applicable under the
Rules of Decision Act. Serious doubt existed as to the circumstances
under which they were applicable in the federal equity court.56
The principles of Erie R. R. v. Tompkins, it had been settled, were
equally valid in diversity actions in the federal courts formerly cogniz-
able in equity.57  This was defined to mean that although the sub-
stantive rights and obligations of parties were governed by state law,
the form of equitable relief was to be determined by the federal courts
54. 311 U. S. 464 (1940).
55. Cf. Morgan, note 46 supra, at 176.
56. Cf. Russell v. Todd, 3o9 U. S. 280 (1940).
57. Ruhlin v. New York Life Ins. Co., 304 U. S. 202 (1938) ; Cities Service Oil
Co. v. Dunlap, 3o8 U. S. 2o8 (1939).
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independent of state law.58 There was some basis, therefore, for a
rational argument that state statutes of limitations went to the remedy
and were, therefore, inapplicable in federal equity actions.
A majority of the Second Circuit thought they were inapplicable.59
A majority of the Third Circuit, relying on niceties previously enun-
ciated by the Supreme Court, thought that they must be applied. 60 On
certiorari to the Second Circuit in its case, York v. Guaranty Trust Co.
of New York, the Supreme Court held that the state statute of limita-
tions governed.61
Conventional conflict of laws distinctions between "substance" and
"procedure" were again brushed -aside. It was indicated that if this
terminology is to have any use in the federal forum in a diversity of
citizenship case it must denote something different than when it is
used in a state forum conflict of laws situation. In the federal forum
"The question is whether such a statute (of limitations) concerns
merely the manner and the ineans by which a right to recover, as recog-
nized by the State, is enforced, or whether such a statutory limitation
is a matter of substance in the aspect that alone is relevant to our prob-
lem, namely, does it significantly affect the result of a litigation fot a
federal court to disregard a law of a State that would be controlling in
an action upon the same claim by the same parties in a State court ?" 62
If the matter intimately affects recovery or non-recovery, a federal court
in a diversity case must follow state law; otherwise the intendment
of Erie R. R. v. Tompkins would be defeated. 63
The pattern woven by the Palmer, Stoner, and York decisions ap-
pears clear at this date. Conventional conflict of laws characterization
of matters as "procedural" or "substantive" has little if any bearing
upon whether a federal court in a diversity suit is or is not to apply
state law in cases where there is no applicable Federal Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure. In such instances it is more important and desirable for federal
courts to achieve uniformity with state administration of state law.
This objective cannot be achieved if the federal court is free to make
determinations independent of state law and such freedom will, almost
as a matter of law, yield a result substantially different from that which
would have obtained in the state court where the federal court sits.
The critical test in such instances, therefore, is whether an important
58. Black & Yates, Inc. v. Mahogany Ass'n, Inc., 129 F. (2d) 227 (C. C. A. 3d,
1942); Maxwell v. Enterprise Wall Paper Mfg. Co., I3I F. (2d) 4oo (C. C. A. 3d,
1942).
59. York v. Guaranty Trust Co. of New York, 143 F. (2d) 503 (1944).
6o. Overfield v. Pennroad Corp., 146 F. (2d) 889 (I944).
61. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U. S. 99 (1945).
62. Id. at io9 (1945).
63. For a subsequent comment by the Court on the York, decision, see Holmberg
v. Armbrecht, 66 S. Ct. 582, 583, 584 (946).
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difference in result will be made possible if state law is not applied. If
it will be made possible, state law controls. Thus, for example, state
statutes of frauds, some state rules of judicial notice, and state rules
as to measure of damages should be controlling in diversity actions in
the federal court.A3a
The same principles should be applicable in those matters which
have been referred to as concerning the exercise of judicial functions
by the trial judge as at common law. This will still permit an area
of freedom from state law since it will be very difficult to establish that
comments or the lack of comments by a trial judge on the credibility of
witnesses or on the weight of the evidence or the manner of instructing
a jury will necessarily make a difference in the outcome of litigation.
The path is not as well defined in the case of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. Certainly the application of a number of the rules
will, to the extent that state law is contrary, cause a different result in
the federal court than would have been reached in the local state court.
If the rules are to be upheld in the interests of a uniform system of
federal procedure the above test is inadequate. In view of the admitted
federal power over procedure in the federal courts, it is submitted that
when the Congress has exercised that power, it has in a sense "occu-
pied ihe field" and-the test should be whether the rule has any relation
as to how a federal court shall conduct its business. If it does, the rule
should be upheld. Under this test, for example, the federal rule that a
plaintiff in a class action must allege that he was a shareholder at the
time of the transaction complained of will be valid because it expresses
a policy that a federal court shall not open its doors to anyone who has
purchased his way into a lawsuit. There is some foundation in the
Sibbach, Murphree and Palmer decisions for such a test.
III
" the law of the state . . . declared by its Legislature
in a statute or by its highest court in a decision. ...
After the Tompkins case, it was clear that the federal judge would
have to pay due deference to state law as declared by the highest court
of the state. Accommodation to this restriction of his freedom, though
unpleasant, might be bearable. But surely, if the state's highest court
63a. A per curian opinion in American Seating Co. v. Zell, 322 U. S. 709 (1944),
stated that four members of the Court were of the opinion that proof of a contract
alleged in affidavits on a motion for summary judgment was precluded by the applicable
state parol evidence rule. The Court has reserved decision on the questions whether a
federal court in a diversity case is required by the Tompkins decision to apply state
rules of forum non conveniens, Williams v. Green Bay & W. R. R., 66 S. Ct. 284
(1946), res judicata, Heiser v. Woodruff, - U. S. - (1946), a non-diversity action.
64. Justice Brandeis in the Erie case, 304 U. S. 64, 78 (1938).
308 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
had not ruled upon the point in issue, the federal judge would be able
to exercise his learning in the law? This illusion, though plausible
under the language in which the Tompkins decision was cast, was thor-
oughly shattered by three opinions handed down by the Supreme Court
on December 9, 194o.
In Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Field65 the validity of a New
Jersey testamentary trust was in issue. A state statute dealing with
the matter had already been twice construed by the Chancery Court of
New Jersey, a court of first instance with state wide jurisdiction in
equity suits. The statute had not been construed, however, by the
lower law courts, or by the Court of Errors and Appeals, the highest
court of the state. The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
thought that the construction of the statute by the Chancery Court was
wrong and rejected it.66 The United States Supreme Court reversed:
"An intermediate state court in declaring and applying the state law is
acting as an organ of the State and its determination, in the absence
of more convincing evidence of what the state law is, should be fol-
lowed by a federal court in deciding a state question . . .whether the
question is one of statute or common law." 67 The evidence relied upon
by the Circuit Court of Appeals, the statute itself, did not establish that
the law of the state was other than as stated by the Chancery Court.
The same view was expressed in another of the cases where the
decision of the state court was that of an intermediate court of less
than state wide appellate jurisdiction, there being no convincing evi-
dence that the law of the state was to the contrary.
68
In West v. American Telephone and Telegraph Company 69 one
phase of the very matter before the federal court had been litigated by
the same parties in a lower state court. The federal court was required
to apply the state law as found in that litigation.7"
Narrowly construed and literally applied, these decisions would
bind federal judges, hand and foot-and mind, to the legal mentalities
of judges of any court of a state. A litigant in the federal court would
be submitting his "fortunes to the decision of a court that can read but
must not reason." 71 A possible escape, however, from such complete
confinement, lids in the opinion of Chief Justice Stone in the West
case where he pointed out that it is the duty of a federal court to ascer-
65. 311 U. S. I69 (1940).
66. io8 F. (2d) 521 (1939).
67. 311 U. S. at 177.
68. Six Companies of California v. Joint Highway District No. 13 of California,
311 U. S. 18o (1940).
69. 311 U. S. 223 (1940).
7o. See also Stoner v. New York Life Ins. Co., 311 U. S. 464 (1940).
71. Corbin, The Laws of the Several States (1941) 50 YALE L. J. 762, 768, dis-
cussing the above three cases.
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tain state law from "all the available data" and not to depart from
what a lower state court announces as law unless "it is convinced by
other persuasive data that the highest court of the state would decide
otherwise." 72
What are such "data"? A fortiori, a decision of the highest court
of a state is a conclusive datum unless subsequently overruled by that
court. And if a state decision is overruled while the case in the federal
court is sub judice, the latest expression of state law is controlling.
73
Well considered dicta of the highest court of a state will be of great
weight; less weighty will be the dicta of lower courts. It has also been
suggested that a court's own doubts as to its decision,74 analogies in
the decisions of the highest court of a state, the views of specialty courts
and legislative material 75 may serve to outweigh the decision of an
inferior state tribunal. Refusal of the highest court of a state to review
an intermediate state court decision, on the other hand, is an impor-
tant indication that the latter represents the law of the state.76 An-
other guide of particular value where there is not even a lower state
court decision in point and already tried with success by the Third
Circuit, will be the book sources of law of state courts.77 Resort to all
available devices will have to be had if decisions in litigation in the fed-
eral courts are to be arrived at in accordance with the principles of the
Erie case.
72. 311 U. S. at 237.
73. Vandenbark v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 311 U. S. 538 (194), where a state
decision was overruled while an appeal from the decision of the federal trial court was
pending in the Circuit Court of Appeals.
In Huddleston v. Dwyer, 322 U. S. 232 (I944), the Supreme Court clearly inti-
mated that if the state court had changed its views while a case was pending before
the United States Supreme Court, the latter would apply the latest state decisision
itself. However, if the effect of the latest decision of the state court were not clear,
the Supreme Court would remand the case, as it did in this instance, for the lower
court to interpret and apply the state decision.
74. Note (941) 9 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 458.
75. Note (1941) Wis. L. REv. 528. The weightiness of legislative material such
as, statutes, debates, and hearings, is highly questionable in view of the Field case. See
Corbin, note 71 supra, at 774.
76. See the opinion in the West case, 311 U. S. at 237.
77. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co. v. Klaxon Co., on remand, 125 F. (2d) 820 (1942).
Judge Goodrich examined what sources the Delaware court resorted to in a decision
requiring the determination of a conflict of laws rule, in the absence of prior state de-
cisions. The Delaware court had cited cases from other states, three current text
books on the conflict of laws and the RESTATEMENT OF THE LAw. The Delaware court
it was found, accepted and applied what was set forth in those sources and the court
felt that this was strong evidence of what the Delaware court would do in a conflict
of laws problem. Of particular significance, in the view of the court was the fact that
the RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW had been cited in sixty-eight instances in reported Dela-
ware decisions and fourteen of these citations were to the volume on the conflict of
laws. The court, therefore, concluded that the Delaware court would follow the view
expressed in these authorities and so held. See also, Goodrich, note 18 supra, and
Proof of the Pudding (1941) 27 A. B. A. J. 771.
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Absence of specific and relevant state decisions is no excuse for the
federal court refusing to decice a case and requiring the parties to liti-
gate the issues in the state court.78  Even though the decision of a fed-
eral court will not finally settle the questions of state law involved, it
must determine those questions as best it can with the aid of such light
as is "afforded by the materials for decision at hand. . .. ,, 79 And such
a determination of the law of a state made by a federal judge of that
state and affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals, will not be dis-
turbed by the Supreme Court.80
The indicated "materials for decision at hand" are no doubt but a
segment of the data used by a state court in deciding a case. Whether,
in view of the decisions by the Supreme Court, the data that may be
resorted to will be limited to materials of such a nature or will also
include, as has been suggested," the local social, political and economic
guides relied upon by state courts remains to be seen.8 2 Certainly, a
permissible latitude in thi's respect which is an inverse function of the
extent to which the law of a state has been defined by its courts would
not vitiate the doctrine of Erie R. R. v. Tompkins.
IV
The decisions of the Supreme Court since Erie R. R. v. Tompkins
have unfailingly applied the basic principle of the Erie case that the
result in a diversity of citizenship suit must not differ substantially
merely because suit is brought in the federal forum rather than the
state court, except insofar as the result is controlled by the federal Con-
stitution and federal statutes. Conventional conflict of laws standards
have been cast aside in the quest of this objective.
Yet, the theory underlying Erie R. R. v. Tompkinss and the de-
cisions that have followed are not at variance with the ultimate objective
of a conflict of laws system that the fortuitous choice of a forum shall
78. Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U. S. 228 (1943). Also impractical and cir-
cuitous are the suggestions advanced for legislation permitting a federal court to cer-
tify to the highest court of a state doubtful questions of state law (Note (1941) 9
GEo. WAs~r. L. REV. 458, 465) and for amendment of the federal Judiciary Act to
deny diversity of citizenship jurisdiction where state law is unsettled (Note (94)
Wis. L. REV. 528, 532).
79. Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U. S. at 238.
So. MacGregor v. State Mutual Life Assurance Co., 315 U. S. 280 (i942).
Si. See Corbin, note 71 supra, at 774.
82. Cf. Williams v. Green Bay & W. R. R., U. S. (1946). An action,
brought by debenture holders of a Wisconsin railroad to recover amounts alleged to be
due and payable under the debentures out of earnings in lieu of interest, was removed
to a federal district court in New York. In seeking dismissal of the action, it was
suggested by the defendant that the parties should be remitted to Wisconsin because
a construction of the covenant in the debenture relied upon for the action would pri-
marily affect the interests of the public in Wisconsin where the defendant's railroad
lines were located. The Court rejected this contention pointing out that "such consid-
erations will frequently be involved in applying the rule of Erie R. R. v. Tompkins,
supra. They go no further than to suggest one additional phase of local law which the
federal court, whether it sits in New York or in Wisconsin, may have to apply."
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not make any important difference in the final determination of the
rights and obligations of litigants. The fact of the matter is that by
virtue of the federal system this goal is being more readily attained as
between the federal forum and the forum of the state in which the court
is situated, than as between one state forum and the forum of another
state.
